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1To an economic theorist, all competitive markets are the same. Regardless
of their institutional diﬀerences, we use the Walrasian equilibrium. (...) The
c o n v e n t i o n a lw i s d o mc a nt h e nb es u m m e du pi nt h ec o n c l u s i o nt h a tf r i c t i o n -
less markets are Walrasian. Since the Walrasian theory itself has nothing to
say on this subject, it remains an interesting and open question whether all
frictionless markets are indeed Walrasian. (Gale [5])
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A conventional wisdom in economics is that a model dealing a large number of agents in
frictionless markets always yields a Walrasian outcome. A frictionless market is deﬁned
as a market in which there is no transaction cost, no informational asymmetries, and
so forth. It seems that many economists have shared this view, and only a few have
challenged to provide a theoretical evidence against it. Rubinstein and Wolinsky [23],
among others, were the ﬁrst to refute this conventional wisdom by oﬀering a random
matching model, where the matched agents bargain over terms of trade. They argue
that in such markets, the outcome is not necessarily Walrasian. (See also Rubinstein
and Wolinsky [24].) On the other hand, Gale [5] [6] [7], and Gale and Sabourian [9]
argue against them and conﬁrm the conventional wisdom. They oﬀer other frictionless
and decentralized market models in which the equilibrium outcome is Walrasian.
As for dynamic centralized market games, there are few literature on the nature of
the equilibrium. Thus, in this paper we attempt to present a theoretical evidence that
in some markets the outcome is not necessarily Walrasian. We build a dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model on centralized auction markets, and yield the set of stationary
equilibria which is a continuum. Our model is essentially dynamic; agents live forever
and are involved in either production or consumption in each period. This stands in
contrast with the above random matching models. (For the discussion, see Section 6.)
Moreover, we also build a model on decentralized auction markets and obtain similar
results.
Recently, real indeterminacy of stationarye q u i l i b r i ah a sb e e nf o u n di nb o t hs p e c i ﬁc
and general search models with divisible money. (See, for example, Green and Zhou
[11] [12], Kamiya and Shimizu [16], Matsui and Shimizu [20], and Zhou [28].) Although
the nature of indeterminate equilibria is very diﬀerent between search models and Wal-
rasian market models; for example, overlapping generations models have a continuum
2of equilibria in some cases, but the stationary equilibria are generically determinate.
We consider a counterpart of money searchm o d e l si nW a l r a s i a nm a r k e tm o d e l si sa
cash-in-advance model with inﬁnitely lived consumers. In the model, it is known that
the stationary equilibrium is determinate. (See, for example, Lucas [18].) Given these
arguments, the stationary equilibria in money search models have a quite diﬀerent
feature from those in Walrasian market models. Our question is whether some central-
ized market models other than Walrasian models have real indeterminacy of stationary
equilibria. Our results provide theoretical evidence that real indeterminacy can occur
even in a centralized auction market model with divisible money.
Now we turn to describe our model. We build a dynamic general equilibrium model
with ﬁat money and a ﬁnite number of perishable goods. For each good, there is a
centralized market, where goods are traded by the uniform price auction using ﬁat
money. Each agent can produce a good which she cannot consume but is consumed
by other agents. The utility and cost of production are the same for all agents, and
therefore there is no informational asymmetry. In each period, she can visit just one
centralized market. For example, at period t,i fa na g e n tw i s h e st oo b t a i nm o n e y ,
s h ev i s i t st h em a r k e to fh e rp r o d u c t i o ng o o da n dt h e ni np e r i o dt +1s h eb u y sh e r
consumption good using the money she obtained at t.1 The conditions for a stationary
equilibrium are: (i) each agent maximizes the expected value of utility-streams, (ii)
the money holdings distribution of the economy is stationary, i.e., time-invariant, and
(iii) the total amount of money the agents have is equal to exogenously given amount
of money. We compare the equilibrium with that in the Walrasian market with cash-
in-advance constraints, i.e., the case that equilibria are determined at the price that
demand is equal to supply and the expenditure of each consumer is constrained by the
amount of her money holding. We show that the set of equilibrium allocations with
auction markets is a continuum, i.e., indeterminate, while that of the Walrasian market
model is a singleton. Therefore the sets of equilibria do not coincide.
The general consensus of indeterminacy is either (i) due to the absence of some
important equation, or (ii) equilibria in the real world economy are intrinsically fragile.2
In this paper, we conﬁne ourselves neither to (i) nor to (ii). That is, in the real world
economy, auction markets might have some important feature, which is missing in our
model, and it might lead the economy to determinate equilibria. In this paper, we do
1Even without this limited participation constraint, we can obtain almost the results. See Section B in Appendix.
2The ways are closely related to the Green and Zhou [12]’s statement that assumptions or features of speciﬁcation
that make the diﬀerence between a model economy having determinate or indeterminate equilibrium should be regarded
as economically crucial.
3not investigate the problem and it is an important topic for future research.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the common envi-
ronment in this paper. In Section 3, we investigate a dynamic general equilibrium
model with auction markets and show that there is a continuum of stationary equilib-
ria. Then in Section 4, we show that if the trading institution is the Walrasian market
with cash-in-advance constraints, the stationary equilibrium is unique. We keep the
other environments the same besides the trading institution we introduced in Section 2.
In Section 5, we investigate the logic behind the indeterminacy by classifying monetary
trades into two types. Section 6 contains discussion of some related literature. Finally,
in Appendix we present some related models including a decentralized auction market
model.
2 The Environment
In this section, we present the environment common in this paper. Time is discrete
denoted by t =1 ,2,.... There is a continuum of agents of which measure is one. There
are k ≥ 3 types of agents with equal fractions and the same number of types of goods.
Only one unit of indivisible and perishable good i can be produced by a type i − 1
(mod k) agent with production cost c>0. A type i agent obtains utility u>0o n l y
when she consumes one unit of good i.L e t θ = u/c and assume θ > 1. Let γ > 0
be the discount factor. There is completely divisible and durable ﬁat money of which
nominal stock is M>0 . Finally, the above exogenously given parameters are common
knowledge among the agents, and therefore there is no informational asymmetry.
3 Centralized Auction Markets
In each time period, a centralized market is open for each good. At the jth market,
good j is traded by the auction we specify below. In each period, each agent has a
choice of joining one market or not joining any market. If a type i agent chooses to
join the (i+1)th market, then she becomes a seller of her product, i.e., good i+1. Ifa
type i agent chooses to join the ith market, then she becomes a buyer and bids a price.
The feature of this trade is that an agent cannot involve in two diﬀerent transactions
in the same period. However, even if we relax this constraint, we can obtain the similar
results. (See Section B in Appendix.)
We consider the uniform price sealed bid auction. (For the auction, see Krishna [17].)
4If we consider the case that money holdings distribution is discrete, it is suﬃcient to
analyze just two following cases:
(i) each realized bid is made by a positive measure of agents, and
(ii) only one bid is made by just one agent and the other bids are made by a positive
measure of agents.
Note that the strategy is an equilibrium no matter what the speciﬁcations in the other
cases are.
Let S ∈ [0,1] be the measure of sellers, and b1,b 2,...,b L b et h eb i d sm a d eb y
positive measures of agents, and B1,B 2,...,B L ∈ [0,1] be the corresponding measures.
Without loss of generality, we can assume b1 >b 2 > ···>b L ≥ 0. Denote ˜ B` =
P`
i=1 Bi
and let ˜ B0 =0 .
First, we consider the case (i). If S<˜ BL,t h e r ee x i s t s` such that S ≥ ˜ B`−1 and
S<˜ B`. Then the buyers with bi, i<` , obtain the good with probability one. The
buyers with b` obtain the good with probability
S− ˜ B`−1
B` . Of course, any seller can sell
her good. The uniform price is b`.I fS ≥ ˜ BL, then all buyers obtain one unit of goods
with price bL. Any seller can sell her good with probability
˜ BL
S .
Next, we consider the case (ii). Let ˆ b be the bid by the single agent, say Buyer
0. Consider that the distribution of the other bids is the same as in the case of (i).
Then for the buyers other than Buyer 0, the uniform price and the buyers’ possibility
of winning is deﬁned as in the case of (i). As for Buyer 0, if S<˜ BL and ˆ b>b `,s h ec a n
obtain the good with probability one. If S<˜ BL and ˆ b = b`, she can obtain the good
with probability
S− ˜ B`−1
B` .I fS<˜ BL and ˆ b<b `, she cannot obtain the good. Finally, if
S ≥ ˜ BL, she can obtain the good with probability one.
In this paper, we focus on a stationary equilibrium which has the following features.
First, money holdings distribution has a support {0,p,...,Np},w h e r ep>0i sa ne q u i -
librium price. Thus the money holdings distribution is expressed as (h0,h 1,...,h N),
where hn is the measure of agents with money holding np. Second, equilibrium strate-
gies are Markovian, i.e., we seek for an equilibrium strategy depending only on money
holdings. Finally, the actions taken by the agents with identical characteristics are
symmetric. Thus a candidate for an equilibrium strategy can be deﬁned as a function
of a money holding η ∈ R+,
ξ : R+ → {σ} ∪ ({β}×R+) ∪ {ν},
5where ξ(η)=σ implies that the agent chooses to be a seller, ξ(η)=( β,b) implies
that she chooses to be a buyer and her bid price is b,a n dξ(η)=ν implies that she
does nothing. Thus if there is a ﬁnite number of bid prices (b1,b 2,...,b L) such that
P
{n|bi=ξ(np)} hn > 0, i =1 ,...L, then the price of each good is determined by the above
rule of the uniform price auction. The price is expressed as a function of (h,ξ), denoted
by π(h,ξ). Moreover, as for sellers, the probability of selling good is expressed as a
function of (h,ξ), denoted by νS(h,ξ). Similarly, for each bid b ∈ R+, the probability
of obtaining good is expressed as a function of (b,h,ξ), denoted by νB(b,h,ξ).
The stationary equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 hp,h,ξ,Vi,w h e r eV : R+ → R is a value function, is said to be a
stationary equilibrium with a discrete money holdings distribution if
• h is stationary under the strategy ξ,
• p = π(h,ξ),
•
PN
n=0 pnhn = M,
• there is a ﬁnite number of bid prices (b1,b 2,...,b L)s u c ht h a t
P
{n|bi=ξ(np)} hn > 0,
i =1 ,...L,a n d
• given h and ξ, the value function V ,t o g e t h e rw i t hξ, solves the Bellman equation,
i.e., for η ∈ R+,
V (η)=m a x
©
νS(h,ξ)(−c + γV (η + π(h,ξ))) + (1 − νS(h,ξ))γV (η),
max
b∈R+
[νB(b,h,ξ)(u + γV (η − π(h,ξ))) + (1 − νB(b,h,ξ))γV (η)],γV (η)
ª
.
In this section, we focus on stationary equilibria with N = 1. We consider the
following strategy as a candidate for equilibrium:
• an agent with η ∈ [0,p) chooses to be a seller, and
• an agent with η ∈ [p,∞) chooses to be a buyer and bids η.
We consider the case of h0 ≤ 1
2.T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h em e a s u r eo fb u y e r si sl a r g e rt h a n
or equal to that of sellers, and therefore an agent with η ∈ (0,p) could not win even if
she had chosen to be a buyer.
The stationarity of money holdings distributions is expressed as follows. Since
νB(p,h,ξ)=
h0
1−h0 holds, the measure of agents who can buy is (1 − h0)
h0
1−h0 and their
6money holdings become 0. On the other hand, since agents without money can always
sell, the measure of agents who can sell is h0 and their money holdings become p.T h u s





Similarly, the stationarity of money holdings at p is




Both of them are (the same) identities and thus any (h0,h 1) satisfying h0+h1 =1 ,h 0 ≥
0, and h1 ≥ 0, is a stationary distribution.





−c + γV (η + p), if η <p ,
r(u + γV (0)) + (1 − r)γV (p), if η = p,






Let n be the integer part of η and ι be the residual, then η is uniquely expressed as
η = np + ι.T h u st h ev a l u ef u n c t i o ni se x p r e s s e da sf o l l o w s :











1+rγ [(1 − r + rγ)u + rγc]
o








, if ι 6=0 .
(1)
We need to check the following incentive conditions:
(i) incentive for an agent with η ∈ [0,p) to be a seller instead of doing nothing,
(ii) incentive for an agent with η ∈ [0,p) to be a seller instead of being a buyer,
(iii) incentive for an agent with η ∈ [p,∞) to be a buyer instead of doing nothing,
(iv) incentive for an agent with η ∈ [p,∞)t ob eab u y e ri n s t e a do fb e i n gas e l l e r ,a n d
(v) incentive for a buyer with η ∈ [p,∞)t ob i d sη instead of bidding another price.
7It is easily veriﬁed that (ii) is reduced to (i), and (iii), (v) are automatically satisﬁed.
(i) and (iv) are reduced to the following inequalities respectively:
(I) V (0) ≥ 0,
(II) V (p) ≥− c + γV (2p).





Again, by (1), the following inequality is equivalent to (II):
r ≥
γθ− 1
(1 + γ − γ2)θ − γ2. (3)
In this section, we restrict our attention to the case of γ > 1
θ. Then the RHSs of (2)














there is the corresponding equilibrium, and moreover the above interval is non-empty.
Since r =
h0






γ(θ − 2) + 1
,
γθ− 1







Theorem 1 For any γ ∈ (1
θ,1), there exists a stationary equilibrium with a discrete
money holdings distribution with N =1f o ra n yh0 satisfying (5). Moreover, the
interval in (5) is non-empty.
4 Walrasian Markets
In this section, we deﬁne the concept of stationary Walrasian equilibrium, where a
competitive market is open for each good. We hold the same environment as in the
previous section. More precisely, (a) each agent maximizes the discounted sum of
utility stream for given prices of goods under the budget constraint and the cash-in-
advance constraint, (b) the markets of goods clear, i.e., for each good, the measure of
sellers is equal to that of buyers, (c) the money demand is equal to supply, and (d) the
money holdings distribution and the price of good are stationary, i.e., time-invariant.
8Moreover, as in Section 3, we assume each agent can only join just one market in each
period.
As in the previous section, we focus on stationary equilibria in which all agents with
identical characteristics act similar and in which all of the k types are symmetric. Thus
we seek for equilibria, where the prices of goods are the same. Let the price be p ∈ R+.
For a given p, the behavior of an agent with η ∈ R+ is expressed in terms of a Bellman
equation as follows:
V (η)= m a x
(χ,ζ)∈C
χu − ζc + γV (η
0), (6)
s.t. χp + η
0 = η + ζp, χp ≤ η, η
0 ≥ 0,
where (χ,ζ)=( 1 ,0) when an agent is a buyer, (χ,ζ)=( 0 ,1) when she is a seller, and
(χ,ζ)=( 0 ,0) when she does nothing. Since she cannot become a buyer and a seller
at the same time, C = {(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)}.N o t et h a tχp ≤ η is the cash-in-advance
constraint. The above Bellman equation is expressed by
V (η)=
(
max{u + γV (η − p),−c + γV (η + p),γV (η)}, if η − p ≥ 0,
max{−c + γV (η + p),γV (η)}, if η − p<0.
For a given p, the unique value function V : R+ → R and the optimal policy corre-
spondence φ : R+ → {β,σ,ν} are obtained, where β,σ,a n dν stand for ‘buy’, ‘sell’,
and ‘do nothing’, respectively. Let B be the Borel σ-algebra on [0,∞). A transition
function T : R+ ×B→ [0,1] is said to be consistent with φ if, for any A ∈ B, T(η,A)
is positive only if 3
• σ ∈ φ(η)a n dη + p ∈ A,o r
• β ∈ φ(η)a n dη − p ∈ A,o r
• ν ∈ φ(η)a n dη ∈ A.
Then a stationary Walrasian equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 hp,F,V,φ,Ti,w h e r eF is a probability measure on B,i ss a i dt ob ea
stationary Walrasian equilibrium if
3A transition function T : R+ ×B→ [0,1] is a function such that
• for each η ∈ R+, T(η,·) is a probability measure on (R+,B), and
• for each A ∈ B, T(·,A)i saB-measurable function.
For the details, see Stokey and Lucas [27].
9(i) φ : R+ → {β,σ,ν} is the optimal policy correspondence associated with V ,
(ii) T : R+ ×B→ [0,1] is consistent with φ
(iii) F is stationary under T,
(iv)
R ∞
n=0 ηdF = M,
(v) given p, V satisﬁes (6),
(vi) T(η,{η − p})a n dT(η,{η + p}) are measurable functions of η,a n d
Z




As for (i)-(v), no explanation is needed. (vi) is the market clearing condition for
goods; namely, the measure of buyers is equal to that of sellers. Note that, by Walras’
law, money demand is equal to money supply if (vi) is satisﬁed.
Clearly, p = 0 is not consistent with the incentive of sellers. Suppose p>0i sa n
equilibrium price. An agent with η ≥ p clearly chooses to be a buyer. Thus η ≥ 2p
is no longer a transient state. Similarly, an agent with η <pcannot buy and chooses
to be a seller if γV (η + p) − c>γV (η). Thus, if the inequality holds, the market
clearing condition implies that the measure of agents with η ∈ [0,p) is equal to that
with η ∈ [p,2p). Then the Bellman equation becomes as follows:
V (η)=
(
−c + γV (η + p), if η ∈ [0,p),
u + γV (η − p), otherwise.
The value function is obtained as follows:
V (η)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
γu−c
1−γ2, if η ∈ [0,p),
u−γc









, if η ∈ [np,(n +1 ) p),
. . .
(7)





10is satisﬁed. It is straightforward to show that the stationary Walrasian equilibrium
allocation is achieved when a half of agents have η ∈ [0,p)a n dt h e i rv a l u ei s
γu−c
1−γ2,
and the other half of agents have η ∈ [p,2p)a n dt h e i rv a l u ei s
u−γc
1−γ2.N o t e t h a t t h e
money holdings distribution is stationary if and only if F([0,η]) = F([p,p+η]) for any
η ∈ [0,p).





, there exists a stationary Walrasian equilibrium
hp,F,V,φ,Ti. Moreover, any Walrasian equilibrium is characterized by




{σ} if η ∈ [0,p),




η + p ∈ A and η ∈ [0,p), or
η − p ∈ A and η ∈ [p,∞),
(IV) F satisﬁes
R
ηdF = M, F([0,p)) = 1/2,F([p,2p)) = 1/2, and
F([0,η]) = F([p,p + η]), ∀η ∈ [0,p).
Proof:
From the discussion in the above, for a given p,( V,φ,T) are characterized by (I), (II),
and (III), and they clearly exist. Thus it is suﬃcient to show the existence of (F,p)
satisfying (IV). Let p∗ =2 M and F ∗ be such that F ∗({0})=1 /2a n dF ∗({p})=1 /2.
They clearly satisfy (IV).
In the proof of the above theorem, a probability measure satisfying (IV), F ∗,i s
presented. Of course, there are other probability measures satisfying (IV). For example,
˜ p = 4M
3 and ˜ F such that ˜ F({0})= ˜ F({1
2˜ p})= ˜ F({˜ p})= ˜ F({3
2˜ p})=1
4 satisfy (IV).
In the equilibrium with (˜ p, ˜ F), an agent with 1
2˜ p deterministically alternates between
acquiring ˜ p as a seller and spending ˜ p as a buyer, i.e., she alternates between states
1
2˜ p and 3
2˜ p. Thus the behavior of an agent with 1
2˜ p is exactly the same as that of an
agent without money. Moreover the real allocation and transactions of goods on the
equilibrium are completely the same as those on the equilibrium with (p∗,F∗). It is
quite natural for one to think there is just one equilibrium.
11Corollary 1 The distribution of value in stationary Walrasian equilibria is uniquely
determined, i.e., the half of agents have
γu−c
1−γ2,t h ec a s eo fη ∈ [0,p) , and the rest of
agents have
u−γc
1−γ2,t h ec a s eo fη ∈ [p,2p).
Thus in order to investigate real allocations, we can restrict our attention to the
stationary Walrasian equilibrium with (p∗,F∗). 4
Now we have described each market, we turn to compare the auction markets out-
come derived in the previous section as versus stationary Walrasian equilibrium out-
come derived in this section. Setting h0 =1 /2 in the value function (1), we obtain
V (0) =
γu−c
1−γ2 and V (p)=
u−γc
1−γ2. In this case, a half of agents have the former value
and the rest of the agents have the latter value, i.e., exactly same as the case of the
Walrasian market outcome in Corollary 1. As shown in Theorem 1, there are other
stationary equilibria for h0 < 1
2 in the auction markets, where the values are diﬀerent
from those in Corollary 1.
Theorem 3 The set of outcomes in the auction market equilibrium does not coincide
with that of the stationary Walrasian equilibrium.
5 Real Indeterminacy of Stationary Equilibria in Monetary
Models
In this section, we explore the logic behind Theorem 3. As shown in the previous
sections, the auction markets have a continuum of stationary equilibrium allocations,
while the Walrasian markets have the unique equilibrium allocation, and thus the
outcomes do not coincide. Below, we show that there are two types of fundamental
natures of monetary trades; one has a continuum of stationary equilibrium and the
other has locally unique equilibria. A typical example of the former case is the auction
market, while that of the latter case is the Walrasian market.
In the Walrasian market, the price of goods is determined in the centralized markets.
Thus, as shown in Section 4, it suﬃces to investigate money holdings distributions with
a support expressed by {0,p},w h e r ep>0 is an equilibrium price. In auction markets,
there may exist equilibrium money holdings distributions of which support are not
{0,p}. However, in order to show that the outcomes in the latter case includes the
outcomes in the former case, we only need to focus on distributions with a support
4If we assume that there is an inﬁnitesimally small cost of holding money, then only the equilibrium with F∗ survives.
12expressed by {0,p}.L e t h =( h0,h 1) be a probability distribution on the support,
where hn is a measure of agent with money holding np.
Below, we compare the equilibrium conditions in the previous two sections. Limiting
our analysis on the case that the measure of buyers is larger than or equal to that of














V (η)=m a x
©
(−c + γV (η + π(h,ξ)))
max
b∈R+
[νB(b,h,ξ)(u + γV (η − π(h,ξ))) + (1 − νB(b,h,ξ))γV(η)],γV (η)
ª
.










γV (η + p) − c if η ∈ [0,p),
γV (η − p)+u otherwise,
where the third and the forth equations are the conditions for stationarity of money
holdings. In the both systems, for a given (h0,h 1), p and V are uniquely determined by
p = M
h1 a n dt h eB e l l m a ne q u a t i o n s .A sf o r( h0,h 1), in the equilibrium condition for the
auction markets, any (h0,h 1) satisfying h0+h1 =1,h0 ≥ 0, and h1 ≥ 0, is a stationary
distribution, since h1
h0
h1 = h0 and h0 = h1
h0
h1 are identities. On the other hand, in the
equilibrium condition for the Walrasian markets, (h0,h 1) satisfying h0 + h1 =1i sn o t
necessarily a stationary distribution, since h1T(p,{0})=h0T(0,{p})i sn o ta ni d e n t i t y .
(See the discussion below.) Thus there is one degree of freedom in the former system,
while the solution is determinate in the latter system.
Below, we show that there are two types of fundamental natures of monetary trades;
one has a continuum of stationary equilibrium and the other has only locally unique
equilibria. They are:
13• the amount of money the sellers obtain is always equal to that of buyers pay even
out of equilibria, and
• the amount of money the sellers obtain is not necessarily equal to that of buyers
pay.
It is clear that the auction market is classiﬁed as the former type and the Walrasian
market is classiﬁed as the latter type. Indeed, in the auction markets, the amount of
money the sellers obtain is ph0 and that of buyers pay is ph1
h0
h1 = ph0. By this identity,
any money holdings distribution is stationary, i.e., all (h0,h 1) satisfying h0 + h1 =1 ,
h0 ≥ 0, and h1 ≥ 0 is stationarity, and the set of equilibria is a continuum. On the
other hand, in the Walrasian markets, if p is large enough, then all agents without
money choose to be sellers, i.e., T(0,{p}) = 1, and the amount of money the sellers
obtain is ph0 and the amount of money the buyers pay is at most p(1−h0). Of course,
they are not necessarily the same.
In order to understand the logic of indeterminacy, we investigate more general case,
i.e., the case that a money holdings distribution is expressed as h =( h0,h 1,...,h N)
for some positive integer N. That is, in the auction markets, we consider the case that
some agents with np becomes sellers and the rest of them become buyers. Then the
transition probability is represented by QS
n ≥ 0a n dQB




n is the measure of agents who have np and become sellers and QB
n the measure























In this case, the amount of money the sellers obtain is
PN−1
n=0 pQS
n and the amount of
money the buyers pay is
PN
n=1 pQB
n, and they are identically the same because of the
14rule of the uniform price auction. Thus
N X
n=0




























always holds and thus
PN
n=0 npDn = 0 is an identity. Moreover, QS
n (QB
n)a p p e a rt w i c e




Dn = D0 + D1 + D2 + ···+ DN
=0
holds. If D2 = D3 = ···= DN = 0 holds, then by the above two identities, D1 =0a n d
D0 = 0 follow. Hence among Dn =0 ,n =0 ,1,...,N, two equations are redundant.
Since the number of variables (h0,h 1,...,h N)i sN + 1 and the number of linearly
independent equations including
PN
n=0 hn =1i sN, there is at least one degree of
freedom. Especially, in the case of N = 1 in Section 3, both D0 =0a n dD1 =0a r e
redundant and any (h0,h 1)s a t i s f y i n gh0 + h1 = 1 is a stationary distribution. Note
that an example with N = 2 is given in Section A in Appendix.
In decentralized market models with divisible money, monetary trades typically
classiﬁed as the ﬁrst type. (See, for example, Green and Zhou [11], Kamiya and Shimizu
[16], Matsui and Shimizu [20], and Zhou [28].) For example, suppose (a) a buyer
randomly meets a seller, (b) then the buyer oﬀers a price and an amount of good she
wants to buy, and (c) ﬁnally the seller decides whether to accept or to reject the oﬀer.
In this case, in each matching the amount of money the buyer pays is always the same
as that of the seller obtains even out of equilibria. Thus in the economy the total
amount of money the buyers pay is always the same as that of the sellers obtain even
out of equilibria. By the same logic as in the centralized economy, the equilibria are
typically indeterminate. The only one diﬀerence between decentralized market models
a n dc e n t r a l i z e dm a r k e tm o d e l so ft h eﬁrst type is that equilibrium price dispersion
15might occur in decentralized market models. (See Kamiya and Sato [15] and Matsui
and Shimizu [20].)
6 Discussion
In this section, we classify the related literature into three categories and discuss them
in turn.
The ﬁrst category is cooperative game approach. Relevant literature analyze
economies with a large population by making use of the concept of core. This approach
is initiated by Edgeworth [4]’s classical work, and followed by Shubik [26], Debreu and
Scarf [2], Aumann [1], and Hildenbrand [14], which show the core convergence result in
considerably general frameworks. Particularly, Aumann [1] directly assumes that there
is a continuum of agents and shows that the set of core allocations exactly coincides
with that of Walrasian equilibrium. However, these papers do not give any speciﬁcation
of trading institution or mechanism, and neither lead to any institutional consideration
about market.
Next we deﬁne the literature on non-cooperative game approach as the second cat-
egory. This includes Cournot-type models as Novshek and Sonnenschein [21], and
strategic market games as Shapley and Shubik [25],5 and decentralized market models
as Rubinstein and Wolinsky [23] and Gale [5], [7]. Although these models specify the
details of trading process, they diﬀer from the present paper in modeling the notion of
‘time.’
Marshall [19] deﬁnes the tripartite division of time: a day, a short period, and a long
period. (See also Hicks [13].) The production decision cannot be changed in a day,
but the amount of production good can be changed for a given capital if given a short
period, and in a long period the amount of capital can be changed as well. Following
Marshall’s deﬁnition, we label the models within a day as static models and those within
a short period as dynamic models. Then any model referred in the previous paragraph
is static, since they all describe an economy in which the production is done. On the
other hand, the environment of the present paper is dynamic, since agents are involved
in either production or consumption in each period.
The third category, which is most closely related to the present paper, is consisted
from search theoretic models with divisible money. This category includes Green and
5Dubey, Mas-Colell, and Shubik [3] present axiomatic approach to this issue. For a survey on strategic market games,
see Giraud [10]
16Zhou [11] [12], Kamiya and Shimizu [16], Matsui and Shimizu [20], and Zhou [28]. In
this category, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found in both speciﬁc
and general models, and now there are theories that explain the stationary equilibria
have a quite diﬀerent feature from those in Walrasian market models.
Our model belongs to this category. We consider the centralized auction markets,
and show that the real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria occurs in such markets.
We emphasize that any other model oﬀered in this category assume an agent is ran-
domly matched with other agents and transaction is made in a decentralized way.
Therefore, our paper has signiﬁcance in showing that decentralized feature of money
search models is not crucial for the real indeterminacy result.
Finally, we would like to note that at the end of his book, Gale [8] claims that
convincing models of general equilibrium are the ones in which markets of goods are
distinct, and agents do not trade most goods and do not therefore participate in most
markets, although his formal model in the book does not have the feature. In our
model, there are k ≥ 3 types of agents and the same number of types of goods; a type
i agent produces type i+1 good and she consumes type i good. Moreover, each agent
can transact in just one market in each time period.
Appendix
A Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Centralized Auction Markets
In this section, we prove the existence of mixed strategy stationary equilibria in the
centralized auction market model investigated in Section 3. First, we deﬁne a mixed
strategy stationary equilibrium. A candidate for an equilibrium mixed strategy can be
deﬁned as a function of a money holding η ∈ R+,
˜ ξ : R+ → Ω({σ} ∪ ({β}×R+) ∪ {ν}),
where Ω(A) is the set of probability distributions on a set A. In parallel with Deﬁnition
1 in Section 3, a mixed strategy stationary equilibrium is deﬁn e di nt h ec a s eo faﬁnite
number of bid prices.
We consider the following mixed (behavioral) strategy:
• an agent with η ∈ [0,p) chooses to be a seller,
17• an agent with p chooses to be a buyer and bids p with probability δ ∈ (0,1), and
chooses to be a seller with probability 1 − δ,a n d
• an agent with η ∈ (p,∞)c h o o s e st ob eab u y e ra n db i d sη.
Under the above strategy, money holding 2p is not a transient state. Let h =( h0,h 1,h 2)
and
r =
h0 +( 1− δ)h1 − h2
δh1
. (8)
An agent with p can buy a good with probability r.I ti ss h o w nt h a tr ∈ [0,1] holds
in equilibria. Under the above strategy, the stationarity of money holding distribution
can be written as follows:
rδh1 = h0,
h2 + h0 = rδh1 +( 1− δ)h1,
h2 =( 1− δ)h1,
h0 + h1 + h2 =1 .
A sw eh a v es h o w ni nS e c t i o n5 ,t w oo ft h eﬁrst three equations are redundant. The
stationary distribution is obtained as follows:
h0 =
δr
2 − δ + δr
,h 1 =
1
2 − δ + δr
,h 2 =
1 − δ
2 − δ + δr
. (9)
Clearly, r ≥ 0i m p l i e shn ∈ [0,1] for n =0 ,1,2.
If δ > 0, the uniform price is p. Thus we obtain the Bellman equation as (1) in
Section 3, where r is deﬁned by (8). The incentive conditions for choosing the above
strategy are as follows:
(i) V (0) ≥ 0,
(ii) V (p)=−c + γV (2p).
The ﬁrst inequality is the incentive to be a seller for an agent who possesses no money.
Since V (p)i st h ev a l u ew h e na na g e n tb e c o m e sab u y e r ,t h es e c o n de q u a l i t yi m p l i e s
that the agent is indiﬀerent between being a buyer or being a seller. As in Section 3,
the other incentive conditions can be easily checked. (i) is equivalent to (2) in Section
3, where r is deﬁned by (8), and (ii) is equivalent to
r =
γθ− 1
(1 + γ − γ2)θ − γ2. (10)
18Note that γ > 1
θ implies r ∈ (0,1). It is also worthwhile noting that, substituting (10)
into (9) , (h0,h 1,h 2) can be parametrized by δ. Then substituting (10) into (2), we
obtain the following inequality:
−(θ +1 ) γ
3 +( θ
2 + θ +1 ) γ
2 − (θ − 1)γ − θ ≥ 0.




















,t h ea b o v e
mixed strategy is a stationary equilibrium with a discrete money holdings distribution
for any δ ∈ (0,1].
Note that since (h0,h 1,h 2)a n d( V0,V 1,V 2)d e p e n do nδ, there is real indeterminacy
in equilibria.
B Relaxing the Limited Participation Constraint
In this section we relax the limited participation constraint and show that the similar
results can be obtained as in Sections 3 and 4. We do so by assuming that agents in
this section can simultaneously can involve in both transactions: sell and buy in the
same period.
B.1 Centralized Auction Markets
First, we analyze centralized auction markets. We focus on stationary equilibria in
which money holdings distribution has support {0,p}. W ei n v e s t i g a t et h ef o l l o w i n g
strategy:
• an agent with η ∈ [0,p) chooses only to be a seller,
• an agent with p chooses only to be a buyer and bids p,
• an agent with η ∈ (p,2p) chooses to be a buyer and seller, and as a buyer, bids η,
and
• an agent with η ∈ [2p,∞) chooses only to be a buyer and bids η.
19Under the strategy, the value function is expressed as follows:
V (η)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
−c + γV (η + p), if η ∈ [0,p),
r(u + γV (0)) + (1 − r)γV (p), if η = p,
u − c + γV (η), if η ∈ (p,2p),






Let n be the integer part of η and ι be the residual, then η is uniquely expressed as
η = np + ι. Thus the value function becomes as follows:
V (np + ι)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
rγu−(1−γ+rγ)c






1+rγ [(1 − r + rγ)u + rγc]
o
, if ι =0 ,n 6=0 ,
γu−c
1−γ , if ι 6=0 ,n =0 ,
u−γn−1c
1−γ , if ι 6=0 ,n 6=0 .
We consider the case of γ > 1
θ. Then the incentive conditions are as follows:
(i) incentive for an agent without money only to be a seller instead of doing nothing,
(ii) incentive for an agent with p only to be a buyer instead of being only a seller,
(iii) incentive for an agent with p only to be a buyer instead of being a buyer and seller,
and
(iv) incentive for an agent with 2p only to be a buyer instead of being a buyer and
seller.
Since the value of η = np is the same as the one in Section 3, (i) and (ii) are
equivalent to (2) and (3) respectively.
(iii) is expressed as
V (p) ≥ r[u − c + γV (p)] + (1 − r)[−c + γV (2p)],
and it is equivalent to
−
£





γ(2 − γ)θ − γ
2¤
r − (γθ− 1) ≥ 0. (11)




(θ +1 ) γ
2 − (θ
2 + θ +2 ) γ +2 θ
ª
.






















such that (2) and (11) hold for any r ∈ [r,r], where r =
1−γ
γ(θ−1).M o r e o v e r ,
we can choose γ1 suﬃciently close to 1
θ such that (3) holds for any r ∈ [r,r].
Next, (iv) is expressed by
V (2p) ≥ u − c + γV (2p),
and it is equivalent to
−r(θ +1 ) γ
2 +[ r(θ +1 )− θ]γ +1≥ 0. (12)






> 0, if r>0,
G(1) < 0.










, (12) holds for any r>0.





,t h e r ee x i s tr and r satisfying
0 <r< r ≤ 1 such that there exists a stationary equilibrium for any r ∈ [r,r]. Since
r =
h0
1−h0, we obtain the following result:










,t h e r ee x i s th0 and
h0 satisfying 0 <h 0 < h0 ≤ 1







Next, we consider Walrasian markets. Holding ﬁx the other conditions, we redeﬁne
C and φ. Here, we deﬁne C as C = {(1,1),(1,0),(0,1),(0,0)} and φ as φ : R+ →
21{ω,β,σ,ν},w h e r eω stands for ‘sell and buy’. Note that the Bellman equation is also
expressed by (6).
Below, we consider the case of γ > 1/θ = c/u. As in the discussion in Section 4, an
equilibrium price, if it exists, is p>0. Since an agent with η ∈ [0,p)c a n n o tb u y ,
V (η)=m a x{0,−c + γV (η + p)}
holds. Since an agent with η + p c a nb u ya n ds e l l ,













V (η)=−c + γV (η + p), (13)
i.e., φ(η)={σ}.T h u sb y( 1 3 ) ,
u − c + γV (η)=u − c + V (η − p)+c>u+ γV (η − p).
holds for any η ∈ [p,2p). Since it is easily veriﬁed that σ / ∈ φ(η), we obtain φ(η)={ω}.
Moreover, it is also easily veriﬁed that φ(η)={β} for any η ∈ [2p,∞). Then we obtain
the following result.





, there exists a stationary Walrasian equilibrium






{σ} if η ∈ [0,p),
{ω} if η ∈ [p,2p),
{β} if η ∈ [2p,∞),
(ii) V is deﬁned as
V (η)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
γu−c
1−γ , if η ∈ [0,p),
u−c
1−γ, if η ∈ [p,2p),
. . .
1







η + p ∈ A and η ∈ [0,p), or
η ∈ A and η ∈ [p,2p), or
η − p ∈ A and η ∈ [2p,∞),
(iv) F satisﬁes




Corollary 2 The distribution of value in stationary Walrasian equilibria is uniquely
determined, i.e., the value of any agent is u−c
1−γ.
The above corollary implies that the indeterminacy is not a real one but a nominal
o n ea si nS e c t i o n4 .
C Decentralized Auctions
In the same environment as in Section 2, we consider an economy, where trades take
place in decentralized second price auction markets, and show that there is also a
continuum of stationary equilibria.
In each period, each agent is given a choice of becoming either a seller or a buyer,
or not doing anything. Each seller posts a minimum bid of her second-price auction.6
After observing the distribution of posted minimum bids, each buyer simultaneously
chooses which auction he participates in. After observing the number of the other
participants in the auction he participates in and bids a price. In this environment, we
consider the following strategy:
• an agent with η ∈ [0,p) chooses to be a seller and post a minimum bid p,
• an agent with p c h o o s e st ob eab u y e ra n da l w a y sb i d sp,
• an agent with η ∈ [p,∞) chooses to be a buyer, and
— bids p if there is no participant in the auction,
— bids η if there are other participants in the auction.
6Nothing would change if we assume the sellers also choose her auction format.
23Moreover, we consider the stationary equilibria in which
(i) the support of the money holdings distribution is {0,p},
(ii) h0 ≤ 1
2,a n d
(iii) every buyer randomizes with equal probabilities between auctions with the same
minimum bids.
The equilibrium with (iii) is often investigated in many directed search model, e.g.,
Peters [22]. In such an equilibrium, althought h em e a s u r eo ft h es e l l e r si sn ol e s st h a n
that of the buyers, a seller could be left out of the trade. To be more precise, let
ρ =
1−h0
h0 (then ρ ≥ 1). Then the probability a seller succeeds to sell a good in each
period is obtained as 1−e−ρ, and the probability each buyer with p succeeds to buy a
good in each period is obtained as 1−e−ρ
ρ .7 Let α =1− e−ρ.





α(−c + γV (η + p)) + (1 − α)γV (η), if η <p ,
α





γV (p), if η = p,
u + γV (η − p), if η >p .
Let η = np + ι,w h e r en is the integer part of η and ι is the residual. Then we obtain











(1−γ+γα)ρ+γα {[(ρ − α)(1 − γ + γα)+γα]u + γα2c}
o








, if ι 6=0 .
The incentive conditions are the same as in the centralized auction model, i.e.,
(I) V (0) ≥ 0.
(II) V (p) ≥− c + γV (2p).
( I )i se q u i v a l e n tt o
γ ≥ γ(ρ)=
ρ
(θ − 1)α + ρ
.
Note that γ(ρ) ∈ (1/θ,1). Similarly, (II) is equivalent to
H(γ;ρ)=
£






−ρ(1 − α + θ)+α
2θ + α(1 − α)
¤
γ + ρ + αθ ≥ 0.







< 0, ∀γ ∈ [0,1],





such that, for γ ∈ (0,1),
γ ≤ γ(ρ) ⇔ H(γ;ρ) ≥ 0.
















where α∗ =1 − e−1.S i n c e α∗ > 1




> 0, and therefore




< γ < γ < 1,
ρ > 1,
and for any γ ∈ (γ,γ), there exists a stationary equilibrium with the speciﬁed strategy
with any ρ ∈ [1,ρ). Let h0 = 1
ρ+1, then we obtain the following result:
Theorem 7 There exist γ, γ,a n dh0 satisfying 1
θ < γ < γ < 1a n dh0 ∈ (0, 1
2)s u c h
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